SGU Episode 3

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SGU Episode 3
7th June 2005
(brief caption for the episode icon)
SGU 2                      SGU 4
Skeptical Rogues
S: Steven Novella
B: Bob Novella
P: Perry DeAngelis
Guest
M: Massimo Pigliucci
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Introduction

S: Hello and welcome to The Skeptics’ Guide to the Universe. Today is June 7th, 2005. This is your host, Steven Novella, President of the New England Skeptical Society. With me this week are Perry DeAngelis –

P: Hello, everybody.

S: – and Bob Novella.

B: Good-evening.

S: We have a special guest this week, Massimo Pigliucci, who i will introduce in a moment. But, first, some follow-up from our discussion last week.

News Items

Smithsonian ID Fiasco Follow-Up ()

The Washington Post: Smithsonian Distances Itself From Controversial Film

S: Last week we talked about what is now being known as the Smithsonian Institution ID Fiasco. For those of you who listened, the Smithsonian Institution agreed to co-sponsor a film, which was being promoted by the Discovery Institute, which is an Intelligent Design–Creationism proponent; the film was called –

P: Shocking lack of judgment.

S: Shocking. Shocking lack –

P: Shocking.

S: of judgment and, we agreed, was extremely naïve.

B: And, see, they're more than just proponents. I mean, they are the major arm –

S: Yes.

B: – of the movement.

S: That's correct. They exist to promote Intelligent Design Creationism. The film was 'The Privileged Planet: The Search for Design in the Universe', or 'Purpose in the Universe'. As in response to the Smithsonian Institution's plan there was a backlash of criticism from the scientific and skeptical communities –

P: Shocked.

S: – which has happened in many cases, as we have discussed in the past, when school boards or institutions fall prey to either Creationism or Intelligent Design or– are being used for this purpose, the blogosphere jumps on it, the cyberspace scientific and skeptical community can react almost instantaneously. Mr. Randall Kremer, who was the public affairs agent for the Smithsonian Institute, was flooded with emails. They were essentially embarrassed out of co-sponsoring the film, which is, you know, a minor victory for skeptical activism.

B: I mean, they should have been embarrassed.

S: They should've been embarrassed. Here i'm going to read to you the email that i personally sent to Mr. Kremer –

B: – which i think just put it over the edge.

S: Yes.

B: That was the straw that made them cave.

S: Clearly it was instrumental –

B: No doubt.

S: – in this victory.

P: No doubt.

S: – which is probably representative of the kind of scientific backlash they received. So here's the email:

Mr. Kremer, As a scientist and educator i was very dismayed to hear that the prestigious Smithsonian Institution was co-sponsoring the screening of a film promoting the pseudoscience of intelligent design, 'The Privileged Planet: The Search for Purpose in the Universe'. I strongly urge you to reconsider this. The Discovery Institute is a pseudoscientific organization dedicated to promoting religious belief as science. Intelligent Design is a thinly-veiled religious belief system designed deliberately to remove any overt religious references from what is otherwise classic Creationism. Its purpose is to infiltrate institutions like SI in order to convince the public that it has scientific credentials. Do not be so naïve, as unfortunately others before you have, in thinking that screening this film at SI will not be used by the Discovery Institute and other promoters of ID as scientific authoritative endorsement of ID. In fact, they are already doing so. You have stated that SI policy is such that events of a religious or partisan political nature are not permitted. I would add to that list egregious pseudoscience. Even if you accept the propaganda that ID is not a religious belief, you must acknowledge the consensus opinion of the scientific community that it is simply not science. Do not let SI be exploited to promote an anti-scientific agenda.

P: Hear, hear.

S: And, again, feedback like that, you know, within days forced, embarrassed the Smithsonian Institutiton –

P: He must've got thousands of those.

S: Must've gotten thousands. I hope so. I mean, we and the New England Skeptical Society did our part in spreading the word and encouraging people to write similar emails.

P: And the JREF, with their financial offer –

S: Yeah, well, Randi only $20,000 to SI to not show the film. They did not accept his offer, and in fact they declined to accept the $16,000 from the Discovery Institute. They're getting no money.

B: Well, i –

S: They're showing the film anyway.

B: Steve, i don't think they actually declined to accept it. I think they gave it back.

S: Yes, fine.

P: My understanding was that they returned it.

S: They returned the 16,000 and they removed their co-sponsorship of the film, so – The film is still being screened, you know, at a private function in the Smithsonian Institute, but it's not being sponsored, they're not accepting any funds from them, and clearly the imprimatur, the validation, of a prestigious scientific institution like the Smithsonian Institute has been removed from this film and from the Discovery Institute.

P: So it's 90% good.

S: And i think that they'll be more wary the next time. The real victory here is that this will not happen again. Hopefully.

P: What were they thinking?

S: What were they thinking?

P: Yeah. It's crazy. Crazy.

S: Just incredible.

Science or Fiction (5:09)

S: We are going to also introduce a new segment this week, a segment called "Science or Fiction". In this segment, i am going to challenge my panel of skeptics. I have three news items—scientific breakthroughs, scientific news items—from the past week. I'm going to read you a brief summary of each of those items. The trick is that one of these items is not real. One of these items is fiction. The other two are genuine scientific breakthroughs, one is fiction. The challenge for you two this week is to try to decide which one is the fake one.

P: Mere child's play.

S: You have to bring all of your skeptical tools to bear to see if you can sniff out the fake. You can make your comments about each one as i present them, but wait until i've stated all three before you make your guess as to which one is fake. Are you ready?

B: Mm-hmm.

P: Sure.

S: Let's play.

B: Go for it.

S: Item number one: Dolphins have been observed not only using tools, but also teaching tool use to their children. This is the first example of cultural tool use in a non-primate species. That's item number one. Item number two: Astronomers have discovered an Earth-like planet orbiting a nearby star, 50 light years from Earth. This is the first Earth-sized planet discovered around another star, and astronomers say there are indications that the planet has an atmosphere. This is the best candidate so far for extraterrestrial life.

P: How far?

S: It's about 50 light years from our system.

P: All right.

S: Item number three: French scientists have discovered a way to keep water from freezing at hundreds of degrees below zero—near absolute zero. Those are your three items.

B: Wow. I've got problems with all of them.

S: I know. That's why they were chosen.

B: OK, the dolphins. You said one thing at the end, though, that piqued my interest there. You said that it's the first non-primate species to use tools?

S: Well, cultural tool use—in other words, they're – it's not something that's just innate. They're actually teaching this to their children.

B: OK. 'Cause when you said that, i thought of – 'cause i know there are birds that'll actually use tools to –

S: There are. And there're some birds that have some problem-solving skills.

B: Right.

S: But this is – they're actually –

B: It's cultural. There's actually a cultural thing.

S: They were observed teaching the tool use, yes.

B: OK, now i – of course, since they don't have any hands or opposable thumbs, i assume they're not using their flippers. It would have to be their mouth. So maybe somehow they're using their mouth to manipulate an object they find on the sea floor. I don't think that's –

P: As for me, i'm gonna say that the first one is the truth. I recently, within the last week, saw a special on the Discovery Channel, you know, it showed dolphins being very sophisticated, particularly something that they showed that really struck me was how two males would team up for a long time and keep a female hostage between the two of them. They'd swim around with her, never let her get very far from them –

B: I've heard of that.

P: – for months –

B: Months?

P: – months, they would keep her, so that she would only mate with them.

S: They're smart critters. They're vey smart critters.

P: She'd try to get away, they'd attack her and really keep her corralled.

B: Now –

P: Anyway, it sounds accurate to me.

B: The second one has got to be false. I mean, we simply are not at the –

P: Yeah, it's too far.

B: No, not actually.

P: To see an atmosphere?

B: Fifty light years is not too far. It's the actual size that can't be right. Earth-sized planets we simply don't have the technology yet to ascertain the – to determine or to find planets that are Earth-sized. Typically, the only things we find are bigger than actually Jupiter.

P: Yeah.

B: So we're talking thousands and thousands of times bigger than the Earth.

P: He went beyond that, too, Bob. He said that they had evidence that there was an atmosphere on it.

B: Well, that's possible. I mean, you could –

P: Not that size.

B: Well, using something –

S: All it requires is spectroscopic analysis –

B: Right.

S: – of the light coming from the atmosphere.

B: Spectroscopy would tell you if there were certain elements in the atmosphere. That's not what concerns me. It's the size, and that's just too small. We haven't – we're not close to detecting Earth-sized –

P: That one sounds false to me.

B: We will get there, though. We'll get there, but we're not there yet. It doesn't matter what technique they're using. They could be using the gravitational disturbance of the parent star caused by the planet. Still, Earth-sized planets are still too small to create a nudge that's detectable yet.

S: Interesting.

P: Now, the last one, about the water, i mean –

B: Let me make one more comment about the second one. The other technique is actually—and it was recently perfected—they've actually– they claim to have discovered a planet that was the first planet discovered purely from the reflected light of the parent star, which was quite an achievement. But, still, that was a huge planet, a huge amount of light relatively speaking.

S: So you don't think we're ready for this breakthrough yet.

B: No, not yet. We will definitely get there, and maybe relatively soon. Maybe ten years, six years, but i've heard nothing approaching Earth-sized yet. And, the third one. Perry, did you want to comment on the water?

P: I was simply saying that it's impressive, but it simply seems more reasonable. Not precisely sure how you'd go about doing it.

S: Even though they were French scientists?

(laughter)

P: Yeah, well, we're suspending our disbelief for the moment.

B: At what temperature did you say, Steve? You mentioned near absolute zero.

P:

S: Single digits.

B: Single degrees near absolute zero?

S: Yeah. Eight degrees was, i think, the figure given.

P: That's crazy.

B: That's liquid? Liquid water? I don't – no, i don't see that happening. No.

P: You gotta choose between the two of them.

B: I know. That's just too damn cold. I mean, even, you know, moving water can get colder than 32 by the fact that it's moving, will lower the freezing temperature a little bit, but to that degree? Maybe there's some sort of state that can get water into that makes it somewhat immune to freezing, but i can't imagine what that might be. Let's see. What – how could they – what could they possibly do to liquid water to maintain that state?

P:

B: – even that close –

P: Moving at incredibly high speed?

S: So it's time to cast your votes.

B: OK. By definition –

P: I'm still – i still think number two is less reasonable.

S: Perry votes for number two, the Earth-sized planet around another star. Bob?

B: As what, true? Science or fiction?

S: As the fake one. As the fiction.

P: As the fiction.

B: Now, there's two fiction. Aren't there two fiction?

S: No, there's one fiction. There's two are real.

P: Right.

B: I could have sworn you said one real, two fiction.

P: Come on, Bob.

S: Two are science, one is fiction.

P: These rules are not complicated.

B: OK. Then, well, it's gotta be two. Two is definitely fiction.

S: So you both cast your vote for two.

P: Correct.

B: Too small.

S: OK. Well, you are both good skeptics. You got the correct answer.

P:

S:

P: Now, how did the scientist do that with the water?

B: I'm dying to know.

S: Well, we'll take them in order. Let's take them in order. A group of dolphins living off the coast of Australia teach their offspring to use their snouts with sponges while foraging for food in the sea floor. So, they actually put sponges on their noses to protect their – to protect them while foraging on the sea floor. Then they caught –

B: How do they do this?

S: They stick it on there. And then they caught mothers teaching this to their children.

P: Wow. Wow.

B: That's fascinating. So

S: You were right. Your intuition was right. It was something – they use their snout, not their flippers.

P:

B: Absolutely. So, if they get, like, a red sponge and stick it to their nose, they look kind of like clownfish? Is that how it works?

S: I guess so.

P: Badum-bum.

S: This is by Krutson and colleagues. They analyzed thirteen, what they're calling "spongers", and 172 non-spongers, and concluded that the practice seems to be passed along family lines, primarily from mothers to daughters for some reason.

B: That's very believable. I mean, they're just so intelligent.

P: Women do most of the work in the animal kingdom. That's why.

B: It seems very likely that they improvised some sort of tool use wit their snouts. OK. Makes sense.

S: You're absolutely right with number two. I think that that is eventually going to be a headline –

P: Right.

S: – but we're just a few years too early.

B: Mm-hmm.

S: But Bob is just too up-to-date on the planet-hunting state of the art.

P: Hey, hey! I guessed it, too.

S: You did! But Bob had the details. It's true. You both sniffed that one out.

P: Thank you.

B: Water me! Come on, tell me,

S: OK. Here's the headline. You're gonna love it. "Nanotube water doesn't freeze, even at hundreds of degrees below zero."

B: Wow.

S: So, what French scientists have done is, they've – they're using the carbon nanotubes as a template, and the water molecules filling these tubes take on a similar structure, where the hydrogen and oxygen atoms form a lattice-like bond, and they – it will not freeze. It will continue to flow through this tube, even down to near-absolute temperatures.

B: That's fascinating.

P: Hum.

B: My god. It changes the molecular arrangement of the water?

S: Yeah, it actually changes the molecular arrangement of the water.

B: But can you still consider it liquid water, though?

S: You know, it's – that's a good question. I didn't say it remained a liquid. I said it didn't freeze.

B: A-ha! OK.

P: True.

S: It may actually be another state of water.

B: That makes more sense.

S: It may not technically be the same state as, you know, normal liquid water.

P: It's plasmic?

S: It's not a plasma.

B: No.

S: I mean, it's a new – and i don't know if they're actually going to call it a new phase, but it definitely is a new state that water is in. And it is more like liquid than like ice. It certainly does not form ice crystals. It stays in this lattice formation and does not, you know, freeze into the normal crystalline structure that water ice has.

B: Yeah. It definitely doesn't sound like any of the other states of matter that could account for that. I mean, you couldn't – it doesn't sound liquid to me, it doesn't sound – maybe it's a different type of solid. It's definitely not the other types, like plasma, that Perry mentioned, or some of the more exotic ones, the Bose–Einstein condensates and the fermionic condensates. It can't be that, either. So, maybe it's a new type of solid for water. OK.

P: Interesting as heck.

S: Very interesting. It remains to be seen what the applications of this would be, but these nanotubes technology is very, very new and very, very active area of research, and this is just one example.

B: The applications are – appear to be just utterly mind-boggling for these nanotubes. I've never seen a discovery take off in quite the way that nanotubes has. I mean, just from the get-go, you know, the interest was worldwide, and since then they've found potential applications from computing to fibers to, maybe—to all sorts of applications—electronics. It's amazing how versatile this material appears to be. We'll be hearing a lot about nanotubes.

S: Very interesting. Well, it is now time to bring on our guest.

Interview with Massimo Pigliucci (16:22)

Dr. Pigliucci’s website

S: With us this week is Dr. Massimo Pigliucci, who we simply call "our friend Massimo".

P: (laughs)

S: Massimo is Associate Professor of Evolutionary Biology at SUNY Stony Brook in Long Island. He has published over 70 technical papers in evolution and botany. He's written seven books. His most recent non-technical book is 'Denying Evolution'. He's the author of a column in 'Skeptical Inquirer' magazine called "Thinking About Science", and he's a frequent contributor not only to 'Skeptical Inquirer' but also 'Skeptic', 'Free Inquiry', 'Philosophy Now', and 'Philosopher's Magazine'. He has a doctorate in genetics from the University of Ferrarra in Italy, a PhD in botany from the University of Connecticut, and a PhD in philosophy from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. Welcome to the Skeptic's Guide to the Universe, Massimo.

M: Thank you for having me. That list always sounds a little bit embarrassing.

(laughter)

S: Yeah, it always is embarrassing to hear somebody else read your own CV.

B: I wish i had such a list.

P: It's daunting, yes.

S: Thank you for being on our show this week. We appreciate it.

M: My pleasure.

S: So, i'm sure you've been following, in the news over the past couple of weeks, the recent activity of the – our friends, the Intelligent Design crew –

M: Yes, indeed.

S: – in Kansas City. We just got done talking about the Smithsonian Institute debacle, which, if you hadn't heard, they backed off from cosponsoring the Discovery Institute film.

M: Right. See, sometimes it works.

S: Sometimes it does work.

P: Amen.

S: And, hopefully, people, you know, like the director of the Smithsonian, will think twice before, you know, falling for the Discovery Institute's coy offers in the future. So, what have you been doing recently, in terms of investigating or writing about the Intelligent Design crew?

M: Well, one thing that i've not been doing is to go to Kansas for those scam hearings that they organized with the local Board of Education.

S: Were you invited?

M: Yes, i was actually invited, and i followed the advice of Eugenie Scott of the National Center for Science Education, more or less politely responding that i was – it wouldn't be any for any scientists to participate.

P: So, Massimo, you agree with the basic, what i've been reading, in that the scientific community is really refraining from speaking at that – at those hearings? You agree with that?

M: Right. I agree, and that's actually a change of heart for me, because in the past i've been involved in direct debates with Creationists and Intelligent Design proponents and so on and so forth. Now, under certain circumstances, those debates are actually fun, i guess, and may have a purpose, depending on the venue and the format and so on. But, definitely, in front of a school board, it's not – it doesn't seem like a good idea, because it really, in that case, does provide the other side with some legitimacy that they, frankly, don't deserve.

S: But do you – critics have said – critics of the decision of Eugenie Scott, and you, obviously, and of scientists she advised, to boycott those hearings, have said that they already have legitimacy by the mere fact that they're before a school board, and therefore shouldn't the mainstream scientific position be represented? What do you say about that?

M: Well, it depends on – i think, when we're talking about legitimacy, it depends on who bestows the legitimacy. It seems to me that one thing is to be invited by a school board, who as we know, is elected, and doesn't necessarily have much of an effect on either science, or education for that matter. Another thing is to be, on the other hand, given some credence from a professional biologist or professional scientist, and that's what, i guess, we wanted to avoid in this case. Incidentally, the message was, in no uncertain terms, directed mostly to the school board. In other words, we told them that this was not an acceptable way of deciding these sorts of matters.

S: Do you think that strategy worked?

M: I think it worked better than the alternative in this particular case. We'll see, of course, what the final outcome of the Kansas equation is.

P: Right.

M: There is never a final outcome.

S: Right.

M: They can change their mind every other year.

P: It's true.

S: We thought it was interesting, the unique or new aspect of this case, that the school board's decision, what they've said so far—they haven't rendered a final decision—went beyond just the creation–evolution issue to actually redefining science.

M: Which is, of course – right, which is, of course, what the Intelligent Design side actually wants. Beginning with Phillip Johnson's early books, and certainly now with their chief intellectual Bill Dembski, what they want is, in fact, to redefine science. And that's an interesting point, which i guess we should spend a couple of minutes on. I have often said—i've debated Bill Dembski a couple of times, and we have exchanged opinions in writings as well, and here is Dembski's position, which sounds very reasonable, and i think it's one of the reasons it's so appealing to people who don't have much of a philosophical background, even some scientists. His position is the following: He says, look, it used to be that anything – different kinds of potential causes for events were allowed as possible explanations, since the time of Aristotle—Aristotle included final causes, of course, to which Intelligent Design will belong—as acceptable kind of answers when one wonders about what's going on in the universe. And then, he says, Bacon—the British philosopher—came on the scene, and he decided, more or less arbitrarily, that final causes were out, that science was only a matter of 'how' and not 'why', and, even since, according to Dembski, science has been impoverished, and it's done to bring things back, essentially, to the wholeness of the Aristotelian approach. Now, that sounds very interesting, except that there are a couple of things that don't work. First of all, Aristotle never used final causes in a way that Bill Dembski will like anyway.

S: Mm-hmm.

M: But that's a minor point. The major point is this: There was a very good reason why Bacon suggested what he suggested, which was, you realize that science wasn't going to get off the ground while it was still messing around with supernatural explanations. If one always had the supernatural card to play, any time that one was sort of running out of options, then science would simply never really be able to make progress in understanding the natural world.

S: Right.

M: That's why he said that those kinds of things are out. That worked very well for about a couple of centuries, especially in physics—Galileo, Newton, and so on. Then, Darwin came to play, and the game changed again, because Darwin did contribute what Dembski meant, Darwin did reintroduce final causes in science, in biology. The question of why things happen is a fundamental question in evolutionary biology, and it is a perfectly fair question, which is pursued by biologists since Darwin. It's just that we answer in a different way. When we ask, "Why is the eye structured the way it is?", the answer is "Because natural selection favored certain variations on that structure, which worked better for the purpose of visualizing objects, and so on and so forth. In other words, there is a role for "why" questions in biology. It's just that the answer is grammatically different from the one that Intelligent Design proponents would want to see in –

S: Right. "Why" questions are essentially mechanism. "What is the mechanism of this phenomenon?"

M: Long-term mechanisms. So the distinction here in biology is particularly clear, between "how" questions and "why" questions. So, i can ask those questions, for example again, about the eye, and if i ask "How does it work?", then what i mean is, "What are the molecular, etc. mechanisms that allow the image to be – the light to be captured, the image to be formed and sent to the brain, and so forth?" But if i ask, "Why is the eye there to begin with?", then the answer is, regardless of specific mechanisms, the answer is, "Because there is an advantage for certain living organisms to be able to see what – you know, to perceive and understand their surroundings in terms of light waves.

S: Right. So, evolution is the ultimate "why" answer in – for biology, for biological "why" questions.

M: That's right.

S: Dembski and his crowd would like to reintroduce—essentially take us back before Darwin, before Galileo, before Bacon, even—and to reintroduce supernatural or divine causes into scientific questions. What they say is that by not allowing them we're essentially rigging the game against those types of answers.

M: Right.

S: What's your response to that?

M: Well, my response is that, suppose—i was actually asked this question by Dembski at one point, at a meeting at the New York Academy of Sciences a couple of years ago—and the question is, suppose, for a moment, that in fact we do allow Intelligent Design, in the sense that Dembski means, back into science. Suppose that i'm going to be, all of a sudden, the director of the National Science Foundation, and i decide to give three million dollars, over a period of five years, to Dembski—which is a pretty good grant by NSF standards—and i ask him, "What would you do? What sort of experiments would you set up? What sort of empirical hypotheses would you be able to test?"

P: It's a good question.

M: He had no answer.

S: Of course he has no answer.

M: And, so, the other thing is why i've been – i guess, to go back to your question, there are two different kinds of answers to "Why is it that the supernatural is out by definition?", essentially. One is the pragmatic, the one i just provided. You know, from the point of view of practical scientists, i want to see, you know, the proof is in the pudding. What is he going to do? Suppose that i do give you the money. What sort of hypotheses can you test? And, of course, the answer, again, is "None.", because, by definition, of course, the supernatural agent can do whatever the heck he wants –

S: Right.

M: – so there's no way to predict, and therefore to test, what he's going to do. The other answer is, i think, a little deeper, and that's the philosophical answer—and, as you know, most scientists are not particularly well-versed in philosophy—but the philosophical answer is this: It is a matter of principle, once that you invoke the supernatural, you will not be able to propose empirically testable hypotheses. In other words, it's not just a matter of Bill Dembski's limited imagination, or anybody else's limited imagination, that at the moment we can't think of one, but give me enough time and i'll come up with one. A philosopher would argue that, as a matter of principle, if you abandon the position of methodological naturalism in science, you're dead. You're not doing science anymore. You're maybe doing something else—you might be doing theology, you might be doing some sort of philosophy—but you're certainly not doing science. And it is that difference, of course, between philosophical and methodological naturalism, that is very important, subtle for most people, but it's very important in terms of this debate.

S: Right, and they either don't get it or don't want to get it.

M: Right. (laughs) I do have the suspicion sometimes that they don't want to get it.

S: They don't want to get it. Because, you know, how many times can you explain it to them –

M: Right.

S: – and to really not understand it, you know, stretches the imagination.

M: Right. I mean, i can see how some people with no background in either science or philosophy might be a little puzzled by this difference, which, by the way, we should probably explain, but somebody like Bill Dembski, who does actually in fact have a degree in ecological philosophy, it's hard to believe that he doesn't understand the implications of that distinction.

S: Right, and i've had the same experience as you. If you remember, we were together at the World Skeptics Conference a couple of years ago –

M: Yeah.

S: – and i had the opportunity to ask, i think it was Nelson –

M: Mm-hmm.

S: – a similar kind of question, and what he said was that, you know, you cannot question the mind of god, which means, as you just said, any hypothesis about intelligent design—right, about the intelligent designer—that you could seek to test or falsify is rendered unfalsifiable by that statement –

M:

S: – because you can't ask the question, "What would, or what should, the world look like if it were designed by an intelligent designer?", because there's no answer to that question. The answer is, "It looks like whatever it looks like." –

M: Right.

S: – and, therefore, it's not falsifiable, and therefore not science.

M: Correct. There is –

S: You know they have to understand that.

M: Right. There is a caveat here—which, of course, is something that Dembski either as a matter of – either on purpose or because he really doesn't see the difference, he insists on this point—he says, "But, look: There's plenty of good science that is done under the assumption of Intelligent Design." He talks about forensic science, the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, and so on and so forth. And, of course, he's right: That kind of science—archeology, for example—is done under the presumption of intelligent design. But, in those cases, you can, in fact, question the mind of the designer.

S: Right.

M: In fact, the whole point is, if you know, or at least make hypotheses –

M: – about what the designer is doing and why –

S: Right.

M: If you couldn't do that, then there would be no archeology, no SETI –

S: Right,

M: – and no forensic science.

S: Exactly.

P: Exactly.

B: That's a good point.

M: And, so, Intelligent Design is a little too broad of a term.

S: So it's a false analogy on their part.

M: That's right, exactly. It is.

S: I've always – it's always struck me, too, that it's one enormous logical fallacy. Now, we keep track of logical fallacies on the show. We actually have our top 20 list of logical fallacies –

M: (laugter)

S: – which you can read on our website, at theness.com. There's a couple that they're using here. One, of course, is the argument from ignorance: "We don't know something, therefore God did it."

M: Right.

S: And we – specifically, in this type of explanation, you can also call that the "god of the gaps" argument.

M: Right.

S: But it's also confusing currently unexplained with unexplainable. Again, that's sort of, "The current gap of knowledge, that's what God did."

M: Right.

S: And, as that gap retreats, and the ever-advancing, you know, knowledge of science, God fills whatever crevices are currently unexplained as if they never will be explained –

M: Right.

S: – even though, tomorrow, they are explained.

M: I would make, also, an even third-level distinction. That is, there are two kinds of unexplainable questions or phenomena.

S: Mm-hmm.

M: There is the impossibility to explain something because, in fact, there is no explanation within the realm of natural laws—which is the sort of unexplainable phenomenon that Dembski likes—but there is also what philosophers call epistemic unexplainability. There may be some things out there that are explainable in the sense that there is an answer somewhere, but, because of the limitations, both current and for possibly future human understanding and reason, we might never be able to get the answer.

S: Right.

B: It's like a dog trying to understand calculus.

M: That's right. Exactly.

B: It's never going to happen.

M: And there are some interesting possible examples within science. So, for example, the question of the origin of life may fall into that category—not because the origin of life is unexplainable in principle—i don't think it is—and, of course, we may explain it. Next week, we may see an article in Science or Nature, somebody actually came up with the right answer. But it may also be the sort of thing that is epistemically unexplainable by human beings simply because there's very, if any, clues left, essentially. This is something that happened four billion years ago. There are no fossils. We have very little understanding, or way to get decent information, about what the conditions actually were. So we might never be able to answer that question. But that—even that, even granting that—it still doesn't bring you any closer to the necessity of a supernatural explanation.

S: Right, right. Once again, we are speaking to Massimo Pigliucci, philosopher and evolutionary scientist, and author of many articles and books. We've been talking about the Intelligent Design phenomenon and proponents of Intelligent Design, which brings us, really, to the philosophical underpinnings of science itself—What is the difference between science and religion, philosophically?—and we've brought up some terms like philosophical naturalism—our organization, for example, advocates what i would call scientific skepticism—and there are some subtle differences between these types of philosophies. You've written several reviews and articles, for example, criticizing Stephen Jay Gould's summary, or summation –

M: Right.

S: – of the relationship between science and religion.

M: Right.

S: Gould came up with this idea of non-overlapping magesteria, in which both science and religion occupy different –

B: Domains of knowledge.

S: – intellectual domains—right, different domains of knowledge he calls magesteria—and they each serve their purpose. You're very – you have been very critical of this idea.

M: Well, for plenty of reasons. There's not – i should probably start out by saying that i am not a Gould-hater like some of my colleagues. I really like some of the stuff that Stephen Gould wrote, both technical and non-technical, and i really dislike some of the other stuff. In particular, about religion, there are a couple of things that really, i think, are worth considering in that context. First of all, Gould did not come up with the basic idea that you mention, although he did come up with the fancy name, but that idea goes back, essentially, all the way to St. Augustine.

S: Yes, and he acknowledges that, to be fair, yeah.

M: Right. Now, the basic idea, however, is, i think, ??? for two reasons: Number one, because it hinges on the definition of god, which Gould leaves kind of up in the air for most of that book. At one point, he finally has to come to terms with the fact that, well, in fact, there are some conceptions of god that do go head-on against science. For example, if you are a Young Earth Creationist who believes that there was a worldwide flood four thousand years old – ago, then, i'm sorry, science just tells you you're wrong. And, if your belief in god hinges on that particular belief then you're dead in the water. So even Gould had to acknowledge that it really depends on what you mean by god and what particular version of god you're espousing, which is, of course, very different from the question of science. There are no different varieties of science that we're talking about here. It's either you're – you know, scientists disagree on specific theories, but there is, essentially, one body of methods and knowledge that we call science. On the other hand, religion is an incredibly heterogeneous body of beliefs. So, one needs, at least, to be clear on what one means, because it sounds very nice, it sounds very ecumenical, to say, "Well, science and religion are different areas of expertise, and that's just – keep them separate." Well, it depends. But even within the kind of religion that does not have any direct conflict with science—so, suppose you're, you know, a progressive Catholic. You know, the Pope—the previous Pope, John Paul II—as we know, did acknowledge that the Catholic Church does not have much of a problem—have a problem at all—with the modern theory of – biological theory of evolution.

S: Right.

M: OK. Well, that sounds very good. That still does not amount to say that there's no overlap at all between the two areas of intellectual endeavor. For one thing, because part of science is now getting, actually, to the point of providing explanations, at least tentative explanations, for where religious beliefs and morality come from to begin with.

P: Mm-hmm.

M: Now, i'm not a particular defender of evolutionary psychology, either, but the ideas are out there. And the fact that the ideas are out there means that science is, in fact, beginning to encroach in the area – on the area of morality and religious beliefs and so on and so forth. Should we kick it out, just because we feel uncomfortable about it, or because some people feel uncomfortable about it? I don't think so. That's not to say that current ideas about evolution are more likely or necessarily correct, but it's just a domain that's worth exploring as a possibility.

S: Right.

M: And, lastly, there – the last thing that really, i guess, prompted my disagreement with Gould, is that he seems to somehow have forgotten that there is a whole different area of human knowledge, or human intellectual endeavor, that greatly overlaps, and often contradicts, some religious positions, and that's, of course, philosophy—particularly moral philosophy. So, to say, as he says in that book, that morality is the province of religion...well, wait a minute. Actually, morality is the province of a lot of different kinds of activities—as i said a minute ago, even possibly science—but certainly not only religion. So, in other words, the situation, it seems to me, is a lot more complicated than the nice and neat distinction that, you know, that Gould was trying to make.

S: Yeah, i agree. He did see – he did go out of his way to sort of overstate the non – the historical non-overlapping of science and religion, and it struck me that you have to sort of turn a blind eye to all of the cases of – religion, essentially, completely dominated science, was the explanation for the natural world, and has had to retreat territory, if you will, to scientific explanations and the institution of science. But, do you think you could, you know, rescue a legitimate point from Gould's position by saying that what he's describing is not the historical relationship between science and religion but what the relationship should be—in other words, that religion should avoid overlapping with science and should restrict itself to the domains of morality and to the great unanswerable questions of existence that are inherently not explainable or not explorable by scientific methods? What would you say to that?

M: I think that is a fair point. However, the question then can also be asked the other way around: Should science be restricted from inquiries into morality